Technical Disclosure Commons
Defensive Publications Series
February 2021

AUTOMATICALLY FIXING SECURITY SMELLS IN CONTENT
SECURITY POLICIES (CSP) FOR WEB APPLICATIONS
HP INC

Follow this and additional works at: https://www.tdcommons.org/dpubs_series

Recommended Citation
INC, HP, "AUTOMATICALLY FIXING SECURITY SMELLS IN CONTENT SECURITY POLICIES (CSP) FOR WEB
APPLICATIONS", Technical Disclosure Commons, (February 16, 2021)
https://www.tdcommons.org/dpubs_series/4073

This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License.
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Technical Disclosure Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Defensive Publications Series by an authorized administrator of Technical Disclosure Commons.

INC: AUTOMATICALLY FIXING SECURITY SMELLS IN CONTENT SECURITY POLICIES

Automatically Fixing Security Smells in
Content Security Policies (CSP) for Web
Applications
ABSTRACT
Content Security Policy (CSP) is one of the most promising countermeasures against XSS, but it
should follow some best practices, otherwise security smells (i.e., recurring coding patterns that
are indicative of security weakness) may appear. Among the most important CSP best practices
is to not allow the use of unsafe-inline and unsafe-eval policies. The method disclosed
here adds innovative aspects to the current state-of-the-art to provide automatic means of getting
rid of unsafe policies in CSP.
Existing solutions may automate the definition of CSP to some extent, but won’t help with the
removal of the unsafe-inline and unsafe-eval policies, which require changing the source
code of dependencies:
● unsafe-inline can only be replaced by a nonce-based policy if the nonce is propagated
to all the injected scripts;
● There’s no alternative policy to the use of unsafe-eval, which means that “string as
code” (e.g., calls to the eval() method) must be avoided at any cost.
We propose a method that, at development time (i.e., before releasing software), iteratively and
gradually defines CSP policies according to the violations reported at each iteration. Part of our
method mimics prior-art, but it adds an innovative streak in the situations in which it’s impossible
to define CSP policies according to best practices without changing the source code of
dependencies.
The main components and interactions of our proposal are presented in Figure 1. Like prior-art,
our method starts with a strict CSP, which iteratively and gradually gets more lenient as violations
are reported (follow this link for details on how to enable CSP reporting). If the CSP violations
eventually stop, the process finishes. The innovative streak of our proposal takes place if changes
in web assets (e.g., JavaScript scripts) are required due to nonces that are not propagated or to
the use of “string as code”. In both cases, if the web assets that violate CSP are external to the
application, they have to be downloaded, modified, and stored inside the application (or in any
other server that is under the control of the developers of the application), thus becoming internal
to the application. Next, we present more details on how our proposal works.
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Figure 1: Our proposal’s main components and their interactions. The innovative aspects of our
proposal are shown bold and underlined.

Propagating nonces
Nonce-based policies only work if the nonce is propagated to all the injected scripts. If, for
example, under a nonce-based policy, an script A injects another script B, which injects yet
another script C, but the nonce is not propagated from A to B to C, CSP forbids the execution of
the script that does not get the nonce, so the script that violates CSP must be fixed.
To do that, first, the exact place (i.e., JavaScript API call) of the buggy script injection must be
identified, which is usually an API call like insertBefore(script, element), where script
is inserted before element in the DOM. This information is usually made available by popular
browser development tools. Then, the script that violates CSP has to be modified to become
aware of the nonce before its insertion in the DOM. This can be done by calling the API method
setAttribute(name, value) of the injected script element, where name contains the string
“nonce” and value contains the actual nonce value that must be propagated. Code Snippets 1
and 2 present an example of a script that doesn’t propagate the nonce and its fix, respectively.
var existingScript = document.getElementsByTagName('script')[0]
var newScript = document.createElement('script')
existingScript.parentNode.insertBefore(newScript, existingScript)

Code Snippet 1: example of a CSP-violating script that doesn’t propagate the nonce.
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// unmodified line
var existingScript = document.getElementsByTagName('script')[0]
// unmodified line
var newScript = document.createElement('script')
// inserted line: gets an element that has a nonce
var elementWithNonce = document.querySelector('[nonce]')
// inserted line: gets the nonce value
var nonce=elementWithNonce.nonce||elementWithNonce.getAttribute('nonce')
// inserted line: propagates the nonce to the newly added script
newScript.setAttribute('nonce', nonce)
// unmodified line
existingScript.parentNode.insertBefore(newScript, existingScript)

Code Snippet 2: Code Snippet 1 modified to properly propagate the nonce.

Avoiding “string as code”
In order to avoid “string as code”, it's necessary to replace all eval()calls with the actual value
of the strings that are executed by them. We do it in 2 steps. Code Snippets 3, 4, and 5 present
an example of such a replacement, in which the “string as code”, for the sake of simplicity, is “1
+ 1”. Basically, the first step saves the value of the “string as code” in a persistent storage and
the second step replaces the eval() call with the value saved in the persistent storage.
var stringAsCode = operationsToBeEvaluated(); // assume “1 + 1”
eval(stringAsCode) // evaluates 1 + 1, which returns 2

Code Snippet 3: example of code that executes “string as code” through an eval() call.

var stringAsCode = operationsToEvaluated(); // assume “1 + 1”
storePersistently(stringAsCode) // saves "1 + 1" to a persistent storage
eval(stringAsCode) // evaluates 1 + 1, which returns 2

Code Snippet 4: Step 1 for the removal of eval(), which saves the string to be executed in a
persistent storage that will be used in step 2.

1 + 1 // content of the persistent storage saved in step 1

Code Snippet 5: Step 2 for the removal of eval(), which substitutes it with the content of the
persistent storage saved in step 1.

How to keep up with evolving scripts?
In order to allow the web application to keep up-to-date or, at least, aware of potentially stale
script dependencies that keep evolving, our method should be integrated with a CI/CD pipeline.
At each execution of the pipeline, our method should be executed from scratch (i.e., using the
original external dependencies), and the textual difference between the output of the last
execution and the output of the previous one should be calculated. If the result is not empty, then
it can be concluded that the external dependency has evolved, which may trigger an event that
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keeps developer awareness by notifying the evolution of external dependencies. The pipeline
may always use the original dependencies, but before generating a release, it applies our method,
thus "freezing" the modified dependencies for released software.

Disclosed by Mauricio Moraes, Jhonny Mertz, and Chris Myers, HP Inc.
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